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KEEPING CIVIL RIGHTS DEBATES 
CIVIL: REMOVING OPPORTUNITIES 
FOR PREJUDICE 
STEVEN SARACCO 
INTRODUCTION 
Religious freedom played a large role in the founding of the 
United States of America and continues to be one of America’s key 
tenets. The First Amendment states that “Congress shall make no law 
respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free 
exercise thereof.”1 Laws governing religious freedom and equality in 
the United States, however, go beyond these First Amendment 
prohibitions. 
Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 is one such attempt by 
Congress to reinforce religious rights by forbidding employers from 
discriminating against their employees or prospective employees on 
the basis of religion.2 This statute extends the First Amendment’s 
protections of religious minorities by prohibiting private employers 
from discriminating against their employees and applicants on the 
basis of religion.3 
In Equal Employment Opportunity Commission v. Abercrombie & 
Fitch,4 the Supreme Court will decide whether a job applicant bears 
the burden of expressly notifying the employer of a conflict between 
the applicant’s religious beliefs and the employer’s policies for the 
employer to be required to make a reasonable accommodation under 
Title VII.5 This seemingly routine question of statutory interpretation, 
however, invokes much deeper issues of discrimination, equality, 
 
 J.D. Candidate, Class of 2016, Duke University School of Law. 
 1.  U.S. CONST. amend. I.  
 2.  Civil Rights Act of 1964, Pub. L. No. 88-352, 78 Stat. 241 (codified as amended in 42 
U.S.C.A. § 2000e).  
 3.  See id.  
 4.  Equal Employment Opportunity Commission v. Abercrombie & Fitch Stores, Inc., No. 
14-86 (U.S. argued Feb. 25, 2015).  
 5.  Id.  
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religious freedom, and tolerance. 
I.  FACTS 
Abercrombie & Fitch Stores, Inc. (Abercrombie) operates several 
nationwide chains of clothing stores.6 Its flagship store, Abercrombie 
& Fitch, is aimed at customers ages eighteen to twenty-two, and 
Abercrombie Kids targets children ages eight to sixteen.7  
Abercrombie goes to great lengths to preserve and maintain its “East 
Coast collegiate style,”8 and it is unusually selective for a retail store 
in dictating the appearance of its employees.9 
First, rather than hire ordinary sales clerks to staff its retail 
locations, Abercrombie hires “models” to perform sales functions.10 In 
hiring these models, Abercrombie managers rate and hire applicants 
based on different categories: “the applicant’s ‘appearance & sense of 
style,’ whether the applicant is ‘outgoing & promotes diversity,’ and 
whether he or she has ‘sophistication & aspiration.’”11 Applicants may 
receive up to three points for each category, and must total six or 
more points to be hirable.12 Additionally, an applicant must receive at 
least two points in the appearance category, or else that applicant is 
automatically removed from consideration.13 Second, Abercrombie 
enforces a “Look Policy” on all models, containing specific rules on 
grooming and dress.14 Specifically, the Look Policy does not allow 
models to wear black clothing or “caps,” which Abercrombie 
interprets to prohibit headscarves.15 
When she was seventeen years old, Samantha Elauf applied to 
work as a “model” at the Abercrombie Kids store at Woodland Hills 
Mall in Tulsa, Oklahoma.16 Elauf self-identifies as a Muslim and has 
worn a hijab (or headscarf) for religious reasons since she was 
 
 6.  EEOC v. Abercrombie & Fitch Stores, Inc., 798 F. Supp. 2d 1272, 1275 (N.D. Okla. 
2011) [hereinafter Abercrombie I].  
 7.  Id.  
 8.  EEOC v. Abercrombie & Fitch Stores, Inc., 731 F.3d 1106, 1111 (10th Cir. 2013) 
[hereinafter Abercrombie II].  
 9.  See Abercrombie I, 798 F. Supp. 2d at 1275.  
 10.  Petition for Writ of Certiorari at 2–3, EEOC v. Abercrombie & Fitch Stores, Inc., No. 
14-86 (U.S. Oct. 2, 2014). 
 11.  Abercrombie II, 731 F.3d at 1113 (citation omitted). 
 12.  Petition for Writ of Certiorari, supra note 10, at 3. 
 13.  Id.  
 14.  Id.  
 15.  Id.  
 16.  Id.  
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thirteen years old.17 Before her interview, Elauf asked a friend who 
already worked at the store, Farisa Sepahvand, if models were allowed 
to wear headscarves while working.18 Her friend asked Kalen 
McJilton, a manager at the store, who stated “that he did not see any 
problem” with headscarves, especially if the headscarf was not black.19 
Sepahvand relayed this information back to Elauf.20 
Elauf wore a black headscarf to her interview with assistant store 
manager Heather Cooke, but was otherwise dressed in Abercrombie-
style clothing.21 The subject of Elauf’s religion did not arise during the 
interview, but Cooke later stated that she assumed Elauf was Muslim, 
and she assumed the headscarf was worn for religious purposes.22 
Cooke never mentioned the Look Policy by name during the 
interview, nor did she mention that Abercrombie models are not 
allowed to wear black clothing or caps.23 
Unsure about the headscarf, Cooke asked district manager 
Randall Johnson for advice.24 Johnson told Cooke not to hire Elauf 
because she wore a headscarf.25 Cooke pressed Johnson, telling him 
that she believed the headscarf was worn for religious reasons.26 
Johnson told her that it did not matter, Elauf could not be hired 
because the headscarf did not comport with the Look Policy.27 Elauf 
had originally been given a “2” in all three categories.28 After their 
discussion, Johnson instructed Cooke to reduce Elauf’s appearance 
score to a “1” so that Abercrombie would not hire her.29 Cooke told 
Elauf during the interview that she would call in the next day or two 
to “let her know when orientation was.”30 Elauf never heard from 
Cooke again.31 Three days after the interview, Sepahvand told Elauf 
that Johnson instructed Cooke not to hire Elauf because of her 
 
 17.  Id.  
 18.  Id.  
 19.  Id. at 4.  
 20.  Id.  
 21.  Abercrombie I, 798 F. Supp. 2d at 1277. 
 22.  Petition for Writ of Certiorari, supra note 10, at 4. 
 23.  Abercrombie I, 798 F. Supp. 2d at 1277. 
 24.  Petition for Writ of Certiorari, supra note 10, at 4–5. 
 25.  Abercrombie I, 798 F. Supp. 2d at 1278. 
 26.  Id.  
 27.  Id.  
 28.  Id. at 1279.  
 29.  Id.  
 30.  Id.  
 31.  Id.  
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headscarf.32 
 
Abercrombie has granted religious exemptions to its Look Policy 
in the past;33 notably, Abercrombie has allowed Muslim employees to 
wear headscarves.34 Since Elauf was rejected, Abercrombie has started 
to allow more headscarf exceptions.35 Abercrombie has stated that it 
makes every reasonable accommodation it can; however, it has also 
stated that allowing Look Policy exceptions has a negative effect on 
the store.36 
The EEOC, on behalf of Elauf, filed suit against Abercrombie.37 
The district court granted summary judgment to the EEOC. The court 
based this decision on the prima facie case established in McDonnell 
Douglas Corp. v. Green, discussed below.38 
II.  LEGAL BACKGROUND 
A.  Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964: Text and Purpose 
Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 makes it “an unlawful 
employment practice for an employer . . . to discharge any individual, 
or otherwise discriminate against any individual with respect to [her] 
compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of employment, because 
of such individual’s . . . religion.”39 “Religion” includes “all aspects of 
religious observance and practice, as well as belief,” that an employer 
is able to “reasonably accommodate . . . without undue hardship on 
the conduct of the employer’s business.”40 Under Title VII, employers 
must “reasonably accommodate the religious practices of an 
employee or prospective employee, unless the employer demonstrates 
that accommodation would result in undue hardship on the conduct 
of its business.”41 The EEOC stresses that religion is a personal matter 
and protection does not require affiliation with an established belief 
 
 32.  Id.  
 33.  Id.  
 34.  Id.  
 35.  Id. at 1280.  
 36.  Id.  
 37.  Abercrombie II, 731 F.3d at 1114 (10th Cir. 2013).  
 38.  McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973). 
 39.  42 U.S.C.A. § 2000e-2(a)(1) (West 2014). 
 40.  42 U.S.C.A. § 2000e(j). 
 41.  29 C.F.R. § 1605.2(b)(1)–(2) (2014). 
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system.42 
The purpose of Title VII is to prohibit discrimination on the basis 
of “race, color, religion, sex, or national origin.”43 Discrimination can 
be shown when an employer engages in disparate treatment on the 
basis of protected attributes.44 Disparate treatment occurs when an 
employer acts with “discriminatory intent” in dealing with an 
employee.45 Discriminatory intent, in turn, is found when an employer 
discriminates based on a protected attribute, regardless of the 
employer’s motivation.46 
B.  Burden-Shifting Framework 
On summary judgment, in a Title VII employment discrimination 
case, a burden-shifting approach is used.47 Courts developed this 
burden-shifting approach to provide plaintiffs and courts with a tool 
for situations where there is only circumstantial evidence of 
employment discrimination.48 In McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 
the plaintiff claimed to be rejected from a job due to his race, based 
on the facts that he was qualified and that defendant continued to 
search for equally qualified employees after plaintiff’s rejection.49 The 
Court decided that petitioners should be able to present a 
discrimination case based on circumstantial evidence, after which the 
defendant can present evidence to rebut.50 
Under McDonnell Douglas, initially, the plaintiff bears the burden 
of establishing a prima facie case.51 This is met by producing evidence 
(1) of a conflict between her bona fide religious belief and an 
employer’s requirement; (2) that she informed the employer of this 
belief; and (3) that employer declined to hire her due to the conflict.52 
If the plaintiff satisfies these elements, the burden shifts to the 
 
 42.  EEOC Compl. Man. § 12-I(A)(1).  
 43.  Brief for Petitioner at 19, EEOC v. Abercrombie & Fitch Stores, Inc., No. 14-86 (U.S. 
Oct. 2, 2014) (quoting 42 U.S.C.A. § 2000e-2(a)(1)). 
 44.  Id. at 24 (citing Int’l Bd. of Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. 324, 335–36 n.15 
(1977)). 
 45.  Id. (quoting Ricci v. DeStefano, 557 U.S. 557, 577 (2009)).  
 46.  Id.  
 47.  McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973). 
 48.  St. Mary’s Honor Ctr. v. Hicks, 509 U.S. 502, 526 (1993). 
 49.  McDonnell Douglas Corp., 411 U.S. at 805. 
 50.  Id. 
 51.  Abercrombie I, 798 F. Supp. 2d at 1282 (citing Thomas v. Nat’l Ass'n of Letter 
Carriers, 225 F.3d 1149, 1155 (10th Cir. 2000)). 
 52.  Id. 
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defendant who must “‘(1) conclusively rebut one or more elements of 
the plaintiff’s prima facie case, (2) show that it offered a reasonable 
accommodation, or (3) show that it was unable to accommodate the 
employee’s religious needs reasonably without undue hardship.’”53 
The second element of the plaintiff’s prima facie case—that she 
informed the employer of this belief—is interpreted differently in 
different circuits. This issue was undecided in the Tenth Circuit prior 
to this case. McDonnell Douglas does not specify whether the notice 
given to the employer must be direct or whether it is enough for the 
employer to simply know of the applicant’s religious beliefs. Prior to 
this case, four circuit courts of appeals had decided that an explicit 
notice requirement is too strict and would run contrary to the purpose 
of Title VII.54 
C.  EEOC Guidance 
The EEOC has provided guidance on when an employer has an 
obligation to provide an accommodation. Such guidance states that an 
employer has an obligation to make an accommodation “[a]fter an 
employee or prospective employee notifies the employer . . . of his or 
her need for a religious accommodation.”55 The EEOC compliance 
manual similarly states that “an applicant or employee who seeks 
religious accommodation must make the employer aware both of the 
need for accommodation and that it is being requested due to a 
conflict between religion and work.”56 Because Congress has not 
spoken directly to the notice requirement of Title VII, courts are 
likely to defer to the EEOC’s interpretation.57 
III.  HOLDING 
The Tenth Circuit reversed the district court’s decision and 
granted summary judgment for Abercrombie. The court of appeals 
concluded that Title VII’s notice requirements are only met when 
explicit notice of a conflict is given by the applicant to the employer.58 
 
 53.  Id. (quoting Thomas, 225 F.3d at 1156). 
 54.  Adeyeye v. Heartland Sweeteners, LLC, 721 F.3d 444, 450 (7th Cir. 2013); Dixon v. 
Hallmark Cos., 627 F.3d 849, 856 (11th Cir. 2010); Brown v. Polk Cnty., 61 F.3d 650, 654 (8th 
Cir. 1995) (en banc), cert. denied, 516 U.S. 1158 (1996); Heller v. EBB Auto Co., 8 F.3d 1433, 
1439 (9th Cir. 1993). 
 55.  Id. at 1135 (quoting 29 C.F.R. § 1605.2(c)(1) (2014)). 
 56.  Id. (quoting EEOC Compl. Man. § 12–IV(A)(1)). 
 57.  See Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837 (1984). 
 58.  Abercrombie II, 731 F.3d at 1122–23. 
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It is not enough for the employer to have knowledge of the conflict 
from another source, nor is it enough for the employer to infer a 
potential conflict from any interaction with the employee.59 Rather, 
the plaintiff must establish that he or she expressly informed the 
employer of a conflict between his or her religion and the employer’s 
work rule, thereby requiring an accommodation.60 
The court of appeals used a number of different arguments to 
reach this conclusion.61 First, it looked at the Tenth Circuit’s 
precedent.62 The court found that Thomas v. National Association of 
Letter Carriers63 placed the burden on the applicant to inform the 
employer.64 
Second, the court considered the realities of the hiring process, 
particularly the information that is ordinarily available to the parties 
involved.65 In reaching its decision, the court emphasized that, often, 
the only way for an employer to know an applicant’s religious beliefs 
is for the applicant to expressly inform the employer.66 Without this 
express notice, it would be impractical to expect an employer to make 
an accommodation.67 Even if an employer can infer that an applicant 
subscribes to an organized religion, the applicant’s beliefs are still an 
individual choice and may differ from what the employer expects.68 
Further, the applicant likely has a better understanding of those 
beliefs, what the commitments required are, and what kind of 
accommodation would be necessary.69 
Third, the court of appeals looked to the EEOC’s guidance, which 
states that an employer has an obligation to make an accommodation 
“[a]fter an employee or prospective employee notifies the 
employer . . . of his or her need for a religious accommodation.”70 The 
 
 59.  Id.  
 60.  Id.  
 61.  Id. at 1123.  
 62.  Id.  
 63.  Thomas v. Nat’l Ass’n of Letter Carriers, 225 F.3d 1149, 1155 (10th Cir. 2000).  
 64.  See Abercrombie II, 731 F.3d at 1123 (“[W]e construe our own precedent (by its plain 
terms) as placing the burden on applicants or employees.”).  
 65.  Id.  
 66.  See id. at 1133 (“[O]rdinarily, the only way the employer would know such information 
is if the applicant or employee informed the employer.”).  
 67.  Id.  
 68.  See id. at 1133–34 (explaining that an employee or applicant may not consider his 
religious practice inflexible, so the employer would not need to provide a reasonable 
accommodation).  
 69.  Id.  
 70.  Id. at 1135 (quoting 29 C.F.R. § 1605.2(c)(1) (2014)).  
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court also noted that the EEOC compliance manual requires 
applicants to “make the employer aware both of the need for 
accommodation and that it is being requested due to a conflict 
between religion and work.”71 
Judge Ebel concurred in part and dissented in part.72 Judge Ebel 
agreed that it was a mistake for the district court to grant summary 
judgment, but he rejected the explicit verbal notice requirement 
endorsed by the majority.73 While the applicant will have a better 
understanding of his or her religious requirements, the employer’s 
knowledge of the work rules may give the employer superior 
knowledge and awareness of a potential conflict.74 Judge Ebel 
observes this case is an example of when the employer had better 
knowledge of a conflict than the applicant.75 
IV.  ARGUMENTS 
A.  EEOC’s Arguments 
1.  The plain meaning of Title VII, the precedent, and Congress’s 
clear intent refute the Tenth Circuit’s decision. 
The EEOC begins with the text of Title VII, pointing out that the 
statute makes it unlawful for an employer to reject a job applicant 
based on his or her religion, unless the employer can demonstrate that 
an accommodation would constitute an undue hardship.76 
“Religion . . . includes all aspects of religious observance and 
practice.”77 This language easily applies to a situation, such as the one 
at bar, where an employer chooses not to hire an individual after 
learning of her religious practice.78 It is unlikely that Abercrombie’s  
accommodation of Elauf’s headscarf would constitute an undue 
hardship, especially considering that Abercrombie had previously 
 
 71.  Id. (quoting EEOC Compl. Man. § 12–IV(A)(1)).  
 72.  Id. at 1143 (Ebel, J. concurring in part and dissenting in part).  
 73.  Id.  
 74.  See id. at 1144 (explaining that Abercrombie did know there might be a potential 
conflict).  
 75.  Id.  
 76.  Brief for Petitioner at 22–23, EEOC v. Abercrombie & Fitch Stores, Inc., 135 S. Ct. 44 
(Oct. 2, 2014) (No. 14-86) (quoting 42 U.S.C.A. § 2000e-2(a)(1) (West 2014)).  
 77.  Id.  
 78.  See id. at 23 (“[T]he language of this prohibition easily reaches cases in which an 
employer declines to hire someone based on what it correctly understands to be a religious 
practice.”).  
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made accommodations for headscarves under identical 
circumstances.79 
The purpose of Title VII is to prohibit discrimination on the basis 
of “race, color, religion, sex, or national origin.”80 Applying court 
precedent,81 disparate treatment occurs when an employer makes an 
employment decision based on a religious practice of an employee.82 
Disparate treatment is exactly what Title VII aims to prohibit and is 
exactly what happened to Elauf.83 
The EEOC argues that Supreme Court precedent supports this 
interpretation of Title VII and decries any attempt to narrow it.84 The 
Court has declared that Title VII “must be given a liberal 
interpretation” to achieve its broad goals of “prohibit[ing] and 
remedy[ing] discrimination.”85 The Tenth Circuit has ignored this 
guidance and narrowed the scope of Title VII, diluting the statute’s 
potency. 
The Supreme Court has also found that one of Congress’s main 
purposes in enacting Title VII was to focus employers’ decisions solely 
on the merits of employees and applicants, removing biases from the 
process.86 The Court found that religion, among other factors, is 
unrelated to work qualification and should not be a factor in the 
hiring process.87 The EEOC contends that the Tenth Circuit’s decision 
does not comport with this objective because it allows employers to 
reject applicants based solely on religion, as long as notice of that 
religion does not come from the applicant’s own admission.88 
Similarly, Congress’s goal of bilateral cooperation suffers under 
the Tenth Circuit’s decision.89 In enacting Title VII, Congress realized 
that there is no one-size-fits-all approach to civil rights. Congress 
hoped that Title VII would encourage dialogue between employers 
 
 79.  See Abercrombie I, 798 F. Supp. 2d at 1279–1280 (discussing prior instances of 
accommodations for headscarves).  
 80.  Brief for Petitioner, supra note 43, at 19.  
 81.  Thomas v. Nat’l Ass’n of Letter Carriers, 225 F.3d 1149, 1155 (10th Cir. 2000).  
 82.  Brief for Petitioner, supra note 43, at 24.  
 83.  See id. (“[T]he employer has engaged in the type of disparate-treatment discrimination 
at the heart of Title VII's prohibitions.”).  
 84.  Id. at 24–25.  
 85.  See id. (quoting American Tobacco Co. v. Patterson, 456 U.S. 63, 80–81 (1982)).  
 86.  See id. at 25 (“By enacting Title VII, Congress sought to eliminate decision-making 
based on particular aspects of identity that Congress deemed unrelated to merit.”).  
 87.  See id. (citing Trans World Airlines, Inc. v. Hardison, 432 U.S. 63, 71 n.6 (1977)).  
 88.  Id. at 26.  
 89.  Id. at 26–27.  
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and employees, so that each individual situation could be resolved in 
the best way to meet both parties’ needs.90 The Tenth Circuit’s 
decision creates incentives for employers that run contrary to 
Congress’s objectives.91 If an employer learns of a conflict from a 
source other than the applicant, that employer is suddenly 
disincentivized to continue with the hiring process for that individual 
because the employer knows it may lead to the need for an 
accommodation.92 Applicants wearing clothing indicative of minority 
religious groups may well never get past the first stage of the process, 
prior to which they might not have had the opportunity to disclose 
their need for an accommodation.93 
2. The Tenth Circuit’s justifications do not warrant its narrow 
application of Title VII. 
On reaching its decision, the Tenth Circuit relied on the language 
underlying the burden-shifting framework developed from 
McDonnell Douglas.94 In doing so, the court of appeals gave its 
reading of McDonnell Douglas greater weight than the statute itself.95 
The EEOC points out that “burden-shifting frameworks do not 
impose requirements beyond those in the statute.”96 Rather, they 
provide an organized way to examine the evidence as it pertains to 
the law.97 Thus the court of appeals overextended itself by favoring the 
rigid enforcement of the burden-shifting framework over the plain 
meaning and Congressional intent of the statute.98 
The EEOC also refutes the court’s reasoning that explicit notice is 
necessary because the applicant has superior knowledge of his or her 
religious needs.99 While this assertion by the court is likely often 
accurate, it ignores an equally large imbalance of information.100 That 
is, the employer will always know more about its own policies than 
the applicant will, especially at the first interview.101 It is thus 
 
 90.  Id.  
 91.  Id. at 27 (describing the incentives created as a result of this decision).  
 92.  Id.  
 93.  See id. at 27–28 (explaining that employers could decline to hire applicants based on 
perceived religious practices). 
 94.  See id. at 28. 
 95.  Id.  
 96.  Id. at 29.  
 97.  See id. (citing Furnco Constr. Corp. v. Waters, 438 U.S. 567, 577 (1978)).  
 98.  Id.  
 99.  Id.  
 100.  Id.  
 101.  Id.  
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unreasonable to place the entire burden on the applicant.102 
Lastly, the EEOC looks to EEOC guidance, arguing that it 
requires more deference under Skidmore v. Swift & Co.103 than the 
court of appeals gave it.104 The EEOC guidance rejects an explicit, 
direct notice requirement, and the EEOC contends that this should 
direct the court’s decision.105 
B.  Abercrombie’s Arguments 
Abercrombie first claims that EEOC must establish that 
Abercrombie intentionally discriminated against Elauf on the basis of 
her religion.106 Abercrombie contends that its denial of employment—
brought on by its work rule—did not have a discriminatory motive.107 
Rather, it merely had a discriminatory effect.108 While Title VII does 
prohibit some discriminatory effects in addition to all events involving 
discriminatory motives,109 it only requires employers to make 
accommodations when doing so does not cause an undue hardship.110 
Here, adjusting the work rule would cause an undue hardship because 
it is central to Abercrombie’s branding and sales.111 By denying an 
exemption, Abercrombie did not intentionally discriminate.112 
Abercrombie next points to the EEOC’s guidelines. The 
guidelines recognize that religion is a personal and sometimes 
sensitive topic.113 To maintain an atmosphere of comfort and tolerance, 
the guidelines discourage employers from inquiring into applicants’ 
religious beliefs.114 Similarly, they state that it is preferable for an 
employee to ask for an accommodation, rather than for an employer 
to guess.115 
 
 102.  Id.  
 103.  Skidmore v. Swift & Co., 323 U.S. 134 (1944). 
 104.  See Brief for Petitioner, supra note 43, at 30–31.  
 105.  Id. at 31–33.  
 106.  See Brief for Respondent at 1, EEOC v. Abercrombie & Fitch Stores, Inc., 135 S. Ct. 
44 (Oct. 2, 2014) (No. 14-86) (“The EEOC claims that Abercrombie thereby engaged in 
intentional religious discrimination under Title VII.”).  
 107.  See id. (describing Abercrombie’s religion-neutral dress and grooming standards).  
 108.  Id.  
 109.  See generally Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424 (1971).  
 110.  See Brief for Respondent, supra note 106, at 4 (describing requirement to make 
accommodations when it does not cause undue hardship).  
 111.  See id. at 6–7 (explaining the importance of strong brands for retailer success).  
 112.  See id. at 21 (arguing that denial of an exemption to a neutral rule is not 
discrimination).  
 113.  Id. at 30.  
 114.  Id.  
 115.  Id.  
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Abercrombie concludes that it had no choice but to decline to hire 
Elauf, who followed neither of the two paths available to her: comply 
with Abercrombie’s Look Policy or request a religious 
accommodation.116 This type of situation, Abercrombie continues, is 
why a direct explicit notice requirement is necessary to Title VII.117 As 
someone with significant enough interest in Abercrombie’s store to 
apply for a job there, Elauf is very likely to observe that they have a 
Look Policy, even if she cannot detect what the exact requirements 
are.118 It is much less likely that one of Abercrombie’s managers will 
be familiar with the religions of every applicant interviewed.119 
V.   ANALYSIS 
Based on the text of Title VII and the Tenth Circuit’s precedent, 
Abercrombie has a compelling case at first glance. Title VII requires 
an applicant or employee to “inform” their employer, thereby placing 
the onus on the one requesting an accommodation. Requiring explicit 
notice directly from the applicant or employee is the strictest 
interpretation of this language, but it is not the only valid 
interpretation. There is also an element of impracticality involved in 
requiring employers to make accommodations when they have no 
reason to know of that accommodation. For that reason, the explicit 
notice rule outlined by the Tenth Circuit has merit. 
The Court, however, should also look to Congress’s intent in 
passing the statute in determining the best interpretation of “inform.” 
An analysis of Congressional intent sways this case in favor of 
Petitioner. Congress’s stated goal of preventing discrimination in the 
workplace can only be fully achieved with a broader interpretation of 
the notice rule. An explicit notice rule leaves too many doors open for 
unethical employers to deny employment on prejudicial grounds, 
meanwhile placing the burden of proving their prejudice on the 
injured party. 
Given the facts in this case, it runs contrary to Congress’s 
conception of civil rights to allow Abercrombie to base its hiring 
decision on any consideration of Elauf’s religion, as it admittedly did. 
The purpose of Title VII is to require employers to focus only on the 
applicant’s merits. Based on Cooke’s scores of Elauf in the three 
 
 116.  See id. at 9–10 (describing Elauf’s options).  
 117.  Id. at 18.  
 118.  Id. at 10.  
 119.  Id. at 11.  
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categories, Elauf was qualified for the model position she applied for. 
The factor that caused Abercrombie not to hire Elauf was her 
religious practice of wearing a headscarf. 
While it is true that Abercrombie’s Look Policy is neutral and 
does not discriminate, Abercrombie fails to defend against 
discrimination in this particular instance. Abercrombie accurately 
states that Elauf never requested an accommodation and argues that 
giving Elauf an accommodation was therefore impossible. More 
relevant, however, is that Elauf was never given the opportunity to 
request an accommodation, and this absence of opportunity 
originated from Abercrombie’s understanding of her religion. No 
official representative of Abercrombie explained the portion of the 
Look Policy that might conflict with Elauf’s beliefs, despite clear and 
recognized evidence that a conflict existed. Instead, the store simply 
refused to hire her without explanation, knowing that, if it hired her, it 
would have to provide an accommodation. 
This issue—and this case, in particular—comes at a time when 
religious discrimination poses a renewed problem for American 
society. A recent survey shows that Americans are growing 
increasingly concerned about workplace discrimination.120 Since the 
attacks of September 11, 2001, anti-Muslim sentiment has increased in 
the United States.121 Fifty-two percent of Americans say that Western 
society does not respect Muslims.122 Muslims are more likely than 
members of any other religious groups to report facing racial or 
religious discrimination in the past year, at a concerning rate of 48 
percent.123 Much of this anti-Muslim sentiment results from a lack of 
knowledge about Islam.124 Considering this fact in light of Congress’s 
wish that Title VII would encourage communication between 
applicants and employers, it becomes especially important to ensure 
that the doorway to conversation remains open. It is thus especially 
important for the Court—as the neutral protector of minority rights—
to step in and enforce the rights granted by Title VII for all 
 
 120.  TANENBAUM CTR. FOR INTERRELIGIOUS UNDERSTANDING, WHAT AMERICAN 
WORKERS REALLY THINK ABOUT RELIGION: TANENBAUM’S 2013 SURVEY OF AMERICAN 
WORKERS AND RELIGION 5 (2013), available at http://op.bna.com/dlrcases.nsf/id/bpen-
9b7pks/$File/2013TanenbaumWorkplaceAndReligionSurveyEmail.pdf.  
 121.  Islamophobia: Understanding Anti-Muslim Sentiment in the West, GALLUP, 
http://www.gallup.com/poll/157082/islamophobia-understanding-anti-muslim-sentiment-
west.aspx (last visited Mar. 17, 2015).  
 122.  Id.  
 123.  Id.  
 124.  Id.  
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Americans. 
CONCLUSION 
This is a difficult question for the Court with strong arguments on 
both sides. The Court’s hand should ultimately be tipped by 
Congress’s intent in enacting Title VII: to prevent discrimination in 
the workplace based on irrelevant factors such as religion. This is 
exactly the type of discrimination that occurred here, and the Court 
should take this opportunity to reverse the court of appeals and 
create a rule that better serves Title VII’s objectives. 
 
